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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RACE AS A FACTOR
IN INTERRACIAL ADOPTIONS
Race has long been regarded an appropriate factor in child adoption
placement. District of Columbia courts, as in most jurisdictions, rule on
interracial adoption petitions in view of the child's "best interest."' Until
In re R.M. G. and EM. G. ,2 however, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals had never addressed the constitutional validity of the District of
Columbia adoption statute.
1. See, e.g., L. GROW & D. SHAPIRO, BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS 239 (1974)
M. SHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICE 9 (1957); Herzog & Berstein, Why So Few
Negro Adoptions?, 12 CHILDREN 14 (1967). "Interracial" adoptions occur where the adopted
child's race differs from that of the adopting parents' race. In contrast, an "intraracial"
adoption occurs where the adopting parents' race is similar to that of the child. Under the
"best interest of the child" test, the court is free to consider a number of factors including:
the moral fitness of the two parties; home environment proffered by the parties; child's emo-
tional ties to the parties; the parties' emotional ties to the child; the age, sex, race, and health
of the child; desirability of continuing an existing third party relationship; and preferences of
the child. See Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Alaska 1975).
2. 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982). In an adoption proceeding similar to the instant case,
where neither prospective adopting parent is a natural parent of the child, the adopting
parents must petition the court. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16:302 (1981). The court then refers the
petition for investigation and recommendation to the supervising adoption-placement
agency. Within 90 days after investigating the veracity of the petition statements, familial
environment, assets, and other related factors, the agency provides a recommendation to the
court. Considering the child's best interests, the court may grant the petition in the form of
an interlocutory decree awarding the petitioner temporary custody. D.C. CODE ANN.
16:307-16:309 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16:307 (1981). This section states:
(a) Except as provided by section 16-308, upon the filing of a petition the court
shall refer the petition for investigation, report, and recommendation to:
(1) the licensed child-placing agency by which the case is supervised; or
(2) the Commissioner [Mayor], if the case is not supervised by a licensed child-
placing agency.
(b) The investigation, report, and recommendation shall include:
(1) an investigation of:
(A) the truth of the allegations of the petition;
(B) the environment, antecendents [antecedents], and assets, if any of the
prospective adoptee, to determine whether he is a proper subject of
adoption;
(C) the home of the petitioner, to determine whether the home is a suitable
one for the prospective adoptee; and
(D) any other circumstances' and conditions that may have a bearing on
the proposed adoption and of which the court should have knowledge,
including the existence and terms of a tentative adoption subsidy
1022
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This statute requires a statement in the adoption petition indicating the
racial background of the parties involved. Considering an equal protec-
tion challenge to the adoption statute, the R. M.G. court upheld the stat-
ute's validity but remanded the case, directing the trial court to "precisely
tailor" the race factor to the best interest of the child.4 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals was the first court to establish a three-prong
test to determine whether the use of race is precisely tailored to the best
interest of the particular child, thus satisfying constitutional requirements.
Recent state statutory amendments eliminating racial matching require-
ments suggest a legislative trend away from the race-as-a-factor statute.5
At least two states expressly prohibit discrimination in adoption proceed-
ings.6 Several other states, however, consider race a relevant considera-
tion.7 The District of Columbia mandates adoption petition information
regarding the race of the prospective adoptee as well as the adopting par-
ents, unless the prospective adoptee is an adult or the petitioner is the nat-
agreement entered into prior to the filing of the adoption petition
under section 3 of the Act of July 26, 1892 (D.C. CODE, sec. 3-115).
(2) a written report to the court of the findings of the investigation; and
(3) a recommendation to the court whether a final decree declaring the adop-
tion prayed for in the petition should be immediately granted, or whether
the court should grant an interlocutory decree granting temporary custody
of the prospective adoptee to the petitioner, as hereinafter set forth.
(c) The written report submitted to the court shall be filed with, and become part
of, the records in the case.
4. R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 794.
5. See Note, Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternatives for the Hard to
Place, 17 J. FAM. LAW 333, 343 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.471 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-63(c)(3)
(West 1981).
7. At least six states require a statement showing the race of the child, his or her natu-
ral parents, and, in some cases, the petitioners. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
105.C.1, D.4 (1974 & Supp. 1982-83) (pre-adoption review must consider the "social history"
of the prospective parents and "heritage" of child); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-110(2)(a) (1973
& Supp. 1982) (adoption petition must indicate each petitioner's race); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 60.12(i)(c) (West 1966) (adoption petition must specify child's race); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § I (Purdon Supp. 1982-83) (requires racial background information on adopters
and natural parents); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-13 (1976) (adoption order must state
race of adopter and child); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.060 (1961 & Supp. 1983) (peti-
tion for adoption must indicate race of adopter and adoptee).
In 1972, Kentucky passed a statute precluding adoption denial on the basis of the "reli-
gious, ethnic, racial, or interfaith background of the adoptive applicant." Courts are al-
lowed, however, to deny adoptions on religious or racial rationale if "contrary to the
expressed wishes of the natural parent[si." Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.471 (1982). Connecticut
has enacted a statute providing that an adoption shall not be disapproved "solely because of
a difference in race, color or religion" between the prospective parents and the child. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63(c)(3) (West 1981).
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ural parent's spouse.8 In the District of Columbia, as in nearly all
jurisdictions, courts decide interracial adoption petitions in accordance
with their view of the "best interest" of the child.9
Courts have grappled with the relevance of race in adoption proceedings
for some time."° In 1955, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit decided the landmark case of In reAdoption of a
Minor. " There, the court permitted a black stepfather to adopt his white
wife's illegitimate white child. Taking into consideration the District of
Columbia's requirement that the determination be made in the child's
8. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16:308 (1981). Unknown at common law, adoption first existed
legally only in those states where the civil law prevailed. Massachusetts, recognized as the
first state to enact adoption legislation, did so in 185 1. Adoption statutes now prevail in all
states. See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 9-12; Herzog & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 12. See
also In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous II, III Misc. 2d 320, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1981)
(adoption is created and regulated solely by statutory law). Although no states have statutes
which bar interracial adoption, several, including the District of Columbia, expressly recog-
nize race as a relevant factor. The removal of the prohibition of interracial adoption is a
recent occurrence in many states. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (West Supp. 1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-460 (Law. Coop. 1977 & Supp. 1981) (repealed by 1981 Act No. 71,
§ e, eff. May 19, 1981); TEX. LAWS 302, ch. 177, § 8 (1931) (repealed 1973). For example, the
Texas law provided "[n]o white child can be adopted by a negro person, nor can a negro
child be adopted by a white person."
9. See Huard, The Law ofAdoption." Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 749
(1956); Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values in the Adoption of
Children, 4 J. FAM. LAW 7, 9 (1964). See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446
(D.C. Cir. 1955). See also, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. 28 N.Y.S.2d
185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1975); In re St. John, 51 Misc. 2d 976, 272 N.Y.S.2d
817 (Fam. Ct. 1966); Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 II1. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956); In
re Buss, 234 App. Div. 299, 254 N.Y.S. 852 (1932).
10. See Note, Race as a Consideration in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 1969 U.
ILL. L.F. 256, 257; Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 909 (1957). Some early case law dealing with the
interracial issue considered race as a determinative factor. Thirty-three years ago, in Ward
v. Ward, 36 Wash. 2d 143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950), the Washington State Supreme Court
awarded custody of the children of a black father and white mother to the father because
they resembled him.
Ward has never been overruled, but the decision received significant criticism in the
Washington Court of Appeals decision Tucker v. Tucker, 14 Wash. App. 454, 542 P.2d 789
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975). The Tucker court indicated: "We believe that [the Washington
Supreme Court] would specifically overrule the unfortunate language . . . if the issue was
again before the court." Id at 456, 542 P.2d at 791.
By the mid-1950's, however, Ward-type decisions barring interracial adoption became
increasingly suspect. Many cases relevant to interracial adoption concern the use of race in
custody, as opposed to adoption, proceedings. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 678 (1958).
In the absence of contrary statutory or case law, the courts traditionally frowned upon the
mixing of races. See In re R.M.G. and E.M.G., 454 A.2d at 78 n.25 (D.C. App. 1982) (citing
Grossman, A Child of a Different Color. Race as Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceed-
ings, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1968); Note, Adoption in Iowa, 40 IowA L. REV. 228,
234-35 & n.32 (1955); Note, supra note 5, at 341 n.43).
11. 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also Grossman, supra note 10, at 310.
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"best interest,"' 2 the court held that race, although relevant, could not be
determinative of the action.'
3
Although jurisdictions have followed, nearly unanimously, the relevant-
but-not-decisive Minor standard,' 4 courts have found the standard impre-
cise. This has made application of the standard difficult and has often
resulted in inconsistent interpretations.
In In re Baker,'5 an Ohio trial court denied the petition of a Caucasian
husband and his Oriental wife seeking the adoption of an illegitimate child
of English and Puerto Rican heritage. Claiming "[tlhe good Lord created
five races . . . [and] never intended that the races should be mixed," the
trial judge denied the petition. 6 Granting the petition for adoption on
appeal, the Baker court posited that a child should be placed in a family of
similar racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds, but interracial adop-
tions were not precluded.' 7
New York courts have applied the Minor standard in various ways. In
Rockefeller v. Nickerson,"a the New York Supreme Court denied a white
couple's petition to adopt a black child. The petitioners sought an order to
compel acceptance of their adoption petition after the welfare commis-
sioner had refused it. Despite the petitioners' allegation that the petition
was denied because of an unwritten policy "not to accept white foster par-
ents for a Negro child,"' 9 the Rockefeller court declared the evidence in-
sufficient to prove that this was the department's policy.2" By finding the
denial of the petition within the exercise of the Welfare Department's dis-
cretion, the court avoided deciding whether an adoption may be refused
12. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16:203 (1951) (repealed after suit filed, but substantially reen-
acted; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 16:307(b) (1981 & Supp. 1982)).
13. Minor, 228 F.2d at 447-48. Some courts have held that race may not be a relevant
factor in a custody or adoption proceeding. See Beazley v. Davis, 92 Nev. 81, 83, 545 P.2d
206, 208 (1976) (per curiam) (racial considerations in custody proceedings ruled "impermis-
sible discrimination" violative of the fourteenth amendment); Commonwealth ex ret Lucas
v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973) (problems related to racial identity are inap-
plicable in custody proceedings); cf. Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1978) (pre-
sumption based upon sex of parent has no place in custody proceedings).
14. See Note, supra note 5, at 344.
15. 117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E.2d 51 (1962).
16. See C. LARSON, MARRIAGE ACROSS THE COLOR LINE 67 (1965) (quoting trial court
record).
17. Baker, 117 Ohio App. at 28, 185 N.E.2d at 53.
18. 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
19. Rockefeller, 36 Misc. 2d at 870, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
20. Id. Indeed, the court found that "the evidence establishe[d] that there [was] no
departmental policy against interracial adoption." Id
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exclusively on a racial ground.2
New York cases decided after Rockefeller continued the development of
the Minor relevant-but-not-determinative standard. Four years later, in In
re Bonez,22 the court faced endless requests for time extensions as the
agency searched for families similar to the adoptive child's "coloring and
cultural descent.",23 The deleterious effects of lengthy placement periods
and the concomitant irreparable injury to the child prompted the court to
remove the child to another agency that assured prompt placement. 4 In a
further step, the court in In re Bess p. 25 declared that adoption agencies
must provide services regardless of race or religion because racial and reli-
gious obstacles to equal services would continually deny adoptive children
equal protection.26
Texas, Louisiana, Ohio, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit have also applied the Minor relevant-but-not-determinative
standard. In In re Gomez,27 the Texas Appellate Court invalidated two
Texas statutes prohibiting interracial adoption. Finding the statutes viola-
tive of the fourteenth amendment, the court granted a black stepfather's
petition to adopt his wife's two illegitimate white children.28 Similarly, in
Compos v. McKeithen,29 a Louisiana federal district court ruled the state's
statute prohibiting interracial adoption unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, in State ex rel Portage County We/fare Dep't v. Summers,3 °
granted an interracial adoption after the welfare department had denied,
partly on the basis of race, repeated petitions made by the foster parents
over a period of three years. Placing heavy weight upon a "judicially ap-
proved home environment" and the need to avoid relegating the child to a
parentless "life of transcience [sic]," the Summers court considered the
child's best interests and allowed the interracial adoption.3'
A major interracial adoption ruling after the Minor decision came from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Drummond v.
21. For an analysis of the Rockefeller decision, see Alexander, Family Law, 1963 Survey
ofN. Y Law, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 369, 378 (1964).
22. 50 Misc. 2d 1080, 272 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Farn. Ct. 1966).
23. Id at 1086-88, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
24. Id at 1089-90, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
25. 52 Misc. 2d 528, 276 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. 1966).
26. Id. at 533, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
27. 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (per curiam).
28. Id at 659.
29. 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972). The Compos court considered race a relevant-
but-not-determinative factor. Id at 266.
30. 38 Ohio St. 2d 144, 311 N.E.2d 6 (1974).
31. Id. at 150, 311 N.E.2d at 13.
1026 [Vol. 32:1022
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Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Services.32 In Drummond,
white foster parents, after caring for a nonwhite child for over two years,
repeatedly sought agency consent for adoption. At trial, the couple alleged
arbitrary agency action based upon the racial differences between the child
and the couple.33 The district court dismissed the case.34 On appeal, how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioners and their foster child had
proven protectable liberty interests under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
35
Following the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the district court, defendant pe-
titioned successfully for a rehearing en banc.36 The Fifth Circuit, en banc,
reversed the initial appellate decision, and affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint.37
The Drummond court framed the issue as whether race may be a rele-
vant, perhaps decisive, factor in adoption decisions. Although the "auto-
matic" or sole use of race violated the Constitution, the court held that the
use of race as one of the factors in making the adoption decision met con-
stitutional guarantees. 3
8
32. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). Plaintiffs
initially filed a federal claim, 408 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The court denied plaintiffs'
claim as they had failed to assert a prima facie case. Id at 383. Following denial of their
claim in federal court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit, and concurrently
filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia. Later, the Georgia Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't
of Family and Children's Servs., 237 Ga. 449, 228 S.E.2d 839 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
905 (1977). For an analysis of the Drummond decision, see Comment, The InterracialAdop-
lion Implications of Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 17 J.
FAM. L. 117 (1978-79).
33. Drummond, 408 F. Supp. 382, 383 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
34. Id. at 384.
35. Drummond, 547 F.2d 835, 857 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. Drummond, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
37. Id at 1210-11.
38. Id at 1205 (citing In re Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955), Compos v.
McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972)).
The Drummond court cited two recent Supreme Court cases suggesting that a racially
disproportionate impact caused by government activity is insufficient, by itself, to sustain an
equal protection claim founded upon allegations of racial discrimination. Id In Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Supreme Court held that
"proof of racial discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of' four-
teenth amendment rights. Id at 265. United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977),
held that where race is a nondiscriminatory consideration void of "slur or stigma," no four-
teenth amendment violation occurs. Id at 165. The Fifth Circuit then found that the state's
placement process failed to constitute a "racial slur or stigma" since "[it is a natural thing
for children to be raised by parents of their same ethnic background." 563 F.2d at 1205.
The application of Arlington Heights and Carey, however, appears questionable. Even
where suspect classifications or basic rights are not at issue, the Supreme Court has held that
a racial classification must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
1983] 1027
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Notwithstanding other jurisdictions' cases, the District of Columbia last
dealt with race as an adoption factor in In re DeF.3 9 There, a mixed-race
couple, seeking to adopt a child of mixed race, refused to indicate their
racial or religious background on the adoption petition. They alleged that
the statute "violates the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment."4
Declining to address the constitutional issues, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals approved the adoption as if the petition had been
amended with the statutorily required information.4
Therefore, prior to R.M.G., the Minor relevant-but-not-decisive stan-
dard prevailed in reviewing interracial adoption petitions. Concern with
the application of this standard arose from the need to tailor race precisely
to the individual needs of the child. The three-prong test advanced by the
R.M.G. court gives more structure to the Minor standard. This structure
will facilitate judicial resolution of complicated interracial adoption
decisions.
In R.M. G., the adopted child was born to unwed, teenage black parents.
In early January 1978, the child's mother decided to offer the child for
adoption. Without the natural father's knowledge, the mother signed pa-
pers relinquishing parental rights.42 Subsequently, the Department of
Human Resources placed the child with white foster parents.
Three months after placement in the foster home, the foster parents filed
difference having a fair and substantial relationship to . . . [its] object so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374-75
(1974) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Indeed, racial
classifications are inherently suspect, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), and are
unconstitutional unless the state demonstrates that such actions are necessary to promote a
"compelling governmental interest." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) (quoting
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969)). It would appear that cases allowing racial classifications to "banish"
racial discrimination, Carey, 430 U.S. at 156 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 338
U.S. 301, 308 (1966)), to support "the attainment of a diverse student body," Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978) or to remedy "disadvantages cast on minor-
ities by past racial prejudice," are irrelevant. Id at 325.
39. 307 A.2d 737 (D.C. 1973).
40. Id at 738. For discussions of the relevance of religion and adoption decisions, see
Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 383 (1973 & Supp. 1982); Note, Court Refuses Adoptionfor Disbelief in a
Supreme Being-In re Adoption of E., 2 SETON HALL L. REV. 460 (1971); Comment,, ARe-
consideration of the Religious Element In Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 780 (1971); Note,
Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship, and Custody, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 376 (1954).
41. In re DEF, 307 A.2d at 739-40; cf. Pedersen v. Burton, 400 F. Supp. 960, 963
(D.D.C. 1975) (per curiam) (statute mandating marriage license applicants to identify their
race held unconstitutional).
42. R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 780. In Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 985 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that the mere existence of a biological link does not merit an unwed father's due
process right to have personal knowledge of an adoption proceeding. See infra note 67.
1028 [Vol. 32:1022
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a petition for adoption. Upon notification, however, the child's natural
father objected to the proposed adoption. The natural father's own mother
and stepfather then filed a competing petition for adoption. The trial court
granted the petition of the child's black grandparents. Considering all the
relevant factors, the trial court found both families suitable to adopt the
child, but concluded that the race factor "tipped the scales" in favor of the
black grandparents.4 3 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals re-
versed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case for further
proceedings."
On appeal, the R. M.G. court considered whether the adoption statute,
permitting the court to take race into account, withstood strict scrutiny and
whether the application of race in the adoption proceeding was "precisely
tailored" to the individual needs of the child.45
Holding the District of Columbia adoption statute constitutionally sus-
pect because of the statutory racial classifications, the court of appeals sub-
jected the adoption statute to "strict scrutiny.'"46 The use of race in
adoption, therefore, would have been invalid unless its use was necessary
to promote a "compelling" or "overriding" state interest.
In evaluating the statute in light of a compelling state interest test, the
court found no cases expressly declaring that a child's best interest was a
compelling government interest.47 The court concluded, however, that
prior court decisions implicitly treated a child's best interest as one.48 Re-
iterating the common tenet that statutes prohibiting interracial adoptions
violated constitutional guarantees, the R.M. G. court ruled this statute con-
43. R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 792-93.
44. Id. at 794.
45. Id at 786, 791.
46. Id. at 786. The Court has recognized that racial classifications meet constitutional
requirements provided they advance a "compelling" or "overriding" governmental interest
and that interest necessitates the specific use of race. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). Such racial
classifications, moreover, can be necessary to serve a compelling state interest only when
"precisely tailored" to achieve a legitimate purpose. See Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2395
(1982); accord Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343.
The court rejected the intermediate standard of review, found usually in "benign" racial
classifications like affirmative action cases because: (1) a Supreme Court majority finds the
intermediate standard unacceptable; and (2) the court of appeals found the intermediate test
inapplicable in the family law context. 454 A.2d at 786. The court posited that "particularly
vivid examples of invidious discrimination" developed as a result of racial classifications in
the family law context. Id.
47. R.M.G, 454 A.2d at 786.
48. Id.
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stitutional since race is only one of several factors considered in an adop-
tion proceeding.49
Rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection claim that the Constitution prohib-
its race as a relevant issue, the court emphasized its relevance5° noting that
without considering race, those responsible for an adoption recommenda-
tion and decision would be unable to evaluate fully a child's best inter-
ests.5 The adoption statute contained the presumptively invalid racial
classification necessary to advance a compelling government interest52 and
the R.M.G court concluded that it survived a strict scrutiny challenge.53
Although on its face the statute survived the constitutional challenge, its
application to the individual parties did not. The court framed the issue as
whether the racial classification, as applied, was precisely tailored to the
child's best interests to survive strict scrutiny.54
In reviewing the trial court decision toward using the abuse of discretion
49. Id at 794. The court emphasized the caveat, however, that a court may not con-
sider race as a factor either presumptively or automatically. See also Personnel Administra-
tor of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 at 272 (1979); Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 266; cf.
In re Marriage of Kramer, 297 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 1980) (no assumptions automatically
warranted by racial identity; race only a factor where there is "demonstrated relevancy").
The R.M.G court also emphasized that the party seeking to sustain the racial classifica-
tion, in this case the grandparents, had the burden of proving it survives strict scrutiny. This
contrasts with ostensibly race-neutral statutes having a disproportionate adverse impact on a
racial minority. The Constitution mandates that the party seeking invalidation of these stat-
utes must prove a discriminatory purpose. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3275-76
(1982); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
50. The court maintained that adoptees, regardless of any racial difference from their
parents, often find it difficult to establish a sense of identity. Identity, the court indicated,
consists of three elements: (1) a sense of "belonging" in a stable family and community; (2)
a feeling of self-esteem and confidence; and (3) "survival skills" providing the child with the
ability to cope with the world outside the family. R.MG., 454 A.2d at 787 (citing J.
LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPTING ACROSS RACIAL BOUNDARIES 284 (1977)). The
court concluded: "[I1n a significant number of instances where prospects for adoption are
evaluated, those who are responsible for a recommendation and decision . . . will not be
able to focus adequately on an adoptive child's sense of identity, and thus on the child's best
interests, without considering race." R.M. G., 454 A.2d at at 787-88; see also R. SIMON & H.
ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 81-85 (1977); L. GROW & D. SHAPIRO, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION TODAY: VIEWS OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS AND SOCIAL WORKERS (1975);
Silverman & Feigelman, Some Factors Affecting the Adoption of Minority Children, 58 Soc.
CASEWORK 554 (1977).
51. R.MG., 454 A.2d at 787-88.
52. Id. at 788. The court also maintained that no "racial slur" was suggested by the
District of Columbia's criterion. Id. (citing United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165
(1977) (plurality opinion) and Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205)).




standard,55 the court found the lower court decision within its "range of
permissible alternatives." The major concern with the lower court deci-
sion, however, arose regarding the ambiguous analysis substantiating the
decision.56
Maintaining that detailed, written findings and conclusions by the trial
court must be available to assure effective review," the court of appeals
found the trial court's findings inadequate.58 To ensure that proper analyt-
ical steps are taken and relevant racial questions are asked, the R.M.G.
court established a three-prong evaluation whether race affects an adop-
tion contest: (1) what effect each family's race will have upon the child's
development of a sense of identity, including racial identity;59 (2) how the
families compare in this regard;6° and (3) how significant the racial differ-
ences between the families are in light of all of the other adoption
factors.6
Applying these questions to assure a precisely tailored use of race as a
55. As there was no prior demonstrable pattern or practice, the court framed the abuse
of discretion standard in this manner:
[W]e check to be sure that the trial court has exercised its discretion within the
range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper
factor. . . . We then evaluate whether the decision is supported by 'substantial'
reasoning . . . 'drawn from a firm factual foundation' in the record.
Id at 790 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C. 1979)). Realizing that
the trial circumstances may not allow "much elaboration in support of a discretionary rul-
ing," the appellate court may "infer the reasoning upon which the trial court made its deci-
sion." Id (quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d at 365).
56. R.MG., 454 A.2d at 791. Ambiguous trial court reasoning frustrates the appellate
review of the decision. Such ambiguity may force the appellate court to infer trial court
reasoning. This practice, the court maintained, would "invite appellate court creation, and
approval, of a racial analysis that may-or may not-have taken place." Id.
57. Id. at 791.
58. Id. at 794.
59. Id at 791. The court must evaluate the possible effects of each family's race and
racial attitudes upon the child's sense of family and community belonging, confidence, self-
esteem and ability to cope with extrafamilial problems. Id at 791-92. Such relevant ques-
tions, according to the court, may be:
To what extent would the family expose the child to others of her own race through
the immediate family? Through family friendships? Through the neighborhood?
Through school? What other efforts will the family most likely make to foster the
child's sense of identity-including racial and cultural identity-and self-esteem?
To what extent has the family associated itself with efforts to enhance respect for
the child's race and culture? To what extent has the family reflected any prejudice
against the race of the child it proposes to adopt?
Id. at 792.
60. The court posited that the second prong favored prospective parents of the same
race but that prospective parents of a different race may also receive positive rating. Id.
61. This prong offsets the advantages of prospective parents of the same race, since it
brings in all other relevant factors. Id.
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factor in adoption, the R.M.G. court concluded that the trial court did not
articulate its analysis of the race factor in sufficient detail.62 While cor-
rectly focusing on the development of the child's sense of identity, the
lower court made no specific findings regarding the likely impact of race
upon this particular black child under the circumstances. Second, the
court failed to detail the comparative analysis required by prongs two and
three.63 The R.M. court found the lower court's reasoning and attention
to detail inadequate, particularly since race determined the outcome. The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. 6"
Associate Judge Mack, viewing the majority's decision to reach the con-
stitutional issue of equal protection unnecessary, concurred that the statute
satisfied constitutional requirements.65 Judge Mack recommended rever-
sal because the trial court employed race as an impermissible presump-
tion." Judge Mack also criticized the other judges for "quibbling" over
constitutional issues while a young child's status remained in limbo.67
62. Id. at 794. The appeals court recognized that the trial court's "conscientious and
thorough" decision properly treated race as but one of several relevant considerations. After
a three-day hearing of witnesses and expert testimony, the trial court found both families
equally stable and loving toward the child. The differences occurred where the court found
the grandparents preferable with respect to paternal relationship, but the white foster par-
ents were preferable with respect to financial resources. The trial court determined that
another family structural change in the child's life could predictably cause some injury and
concluded that the grandparents' claim finished somewhat less than or at best equal to the
foster parents' claim. Id at 793 n.40.
Although race, therefore, became the trial court's determinative factor, the appeals court
declared that the tipping of a decision in the grandparents' favor by the race factor does not,
in itself suggest a discriminatory result Id.; see also Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205.
63. R.MG., 454 A.2d at 791, 794.
64. Id at 794.
65. Id Judge Mack contended that although the District of Columbia adoption statute
mentions race and religion as factors, the court need not give consideration to these factors.
See In re DeF, 307 A.2d 737 (D.C. 1973) (court avoided constitutional issue); see text ac-
companying notes 37-39.
66. Judge Mack analogized the case to Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1978)
(en banc), where the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held a presumption based upon
a parent's gender irrelevant in custody proceedings. According to the concurring opinion, a
presumption is "nothing more than a guess based upon probabilities .... " R.M. G, 454
A.2d at 795 (Mack, J., concurring) (citing Bazemore, 394 A.2d at 1382 n.7). Those
"probabilities" were not conclusively established in the instant case. R.M .G, 454 A.2d at
795 (Mack, J., concurring). Judge Mack thought that the lower court's ruling in favor of the
grandparents, where all relevant factors except race were in equipoise, constituted an imper-
missible presumption. Id
67. Id at 795. Judge Mack emphasized that more consideration of "a family unit al-
ready in existence" must be made and the emphasis of race should be downgraded. Id.
(citing Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)).
The Supreme Court recently provided some insight into the significance of a psychologi-
cal relationship. In Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983), the Court held that the puta-
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Noting the need to address the specific interests of the individual child,
Judge Mack concurred with the majority that the lower court's analysis
failed to express precisely its findings.
In a well-articulated dissent, Chief Judge Newman disagreed with the
majority finding that the trial court's consideration of race may have been
"insubstantial.- 6 8 Chief Judge Newman argued that the trial court prop-
erly considered race, that the appellate majority employed an improper
standard of review, and that the application of the three-prong approach
developed by the majority failed to justify reversal. The dissent first con-
tested the majority's application of the law to the case facts.6 9 Although
the majority maintained that intraracial adoptions should not be regarded
as generally preferable with respect to a child's identity and socialization,
the dissent advanced the notion that the 'possibility of an adverse effect
.. . would suffice to permit the trial judge to tip the balance in the direc-
tion of the intraracial alternative .. . ."" While the hazards of interra-
cial adoption must not be exaggerated, the dissent maintained, such
hazards must not be ignored."
tive father never established a substantial relationship with his child, while the mother had a
continuous custodial responsibility for the child. Therefore, the equal protection clause does
not prevent a state from affording the two parents different legal rights. Id. at 2996.
Although Lehr deals with a natural father's right to personally know of his child's adop-
tion proceeding, and not an interracial adoption proceeding, it does indicate that the
Supreme Court will give some weight to a family unit already in existence.
68. R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 796 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 796-97. According to the dissent, the majority assumed that the trial court
had ignored the evidence regarding a healthy racial and cultural identity in considering the
love and care offered by each family. Id at 797 n.4.
70. Id. at 799 (emphasis added). The dissent later indicated certain potential hardships
to the child that develop in interracial adoptions. First, a child may not perceive herself as
black or develop an identity as a black person (citing J. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES 104
(1977)). Second, the child may experience a "conflict of loyalties" as she grows older-
caught between two cultures yet accepted by neither. Third, the black child may be unable
to develop certain survival skills. "She will be identified as a black person and will inevita-
bly experience racism. Blacks . . . develop survival skills by coping with such problems,
which they can pass to their children expressly, or more importantly, by unconscious exam-
ple." 454 A.2d at 802-03. Citing several additional authorities, the dissent contended that
interracial parents are an inferior substitute to teach these lessons regarding survival skills.
Id. (citing J. LADNER, supra at 115, 255; Chestang, The Dilemma of Biracial Adoption, 17
Soc. WORK 100, 102-04 (1972); R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 18
(1977) (a study where one-third of interracial parents did not make efforts to teach survival
skills)). Fourth, the child and the adopting family may be subjected to greater racism as
racist attitudes undoubtedly oppose interracial families. Id at 803 (citing Jones, On Trans-
racialAdoption of Black Children, 51 CHILD WELFARE 156, 163 (1972)). Finally, the interra-
cial child may have a more difficult time coping with the fact that she is adopted if her or his
status is evident to the world at large. Id (citing B. JACKSON, FAMILY EXPERIENCES OF
INTERRACIAL ADOPTION 13-14 (1976)).
71. R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 799 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
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Concluding that the possibility of adverse effects from interracial adop-
tion justified a trial court's decision to "tip the balance in the direction of
the intraracial alternative," the dissent addressed whether the Constitution
permitted the court to give weight to the adverse effects of interracial adop-
tion.72 Although the majority stated that the Supreme Court has rejected
intermediate scrutiny for "benign" racial classifications, the dissent main-
tained that the standard should be intermediate rather than strict
scrutiny.73
Nonetheless, the dissent agreed that the statute survived strict scrutiny
because of the existence of a compelling state interest. Here the child's
best interests necessitated the consideration of race,74 and, as the dissent
noted, it was only for this reason that the R.M. G. trial court considered
race.
Finding race relevant, not only as to the particular family, but as to the
outside world as well, the dissent viewed the majority's three-prong test as
overly narrow. While the attitude and behavior of the parents and the
environment must be considered, the dissent maintained that a difference
in race between parent and child is of independent significance. 75 The
72. Id.
73. Id. at 799-800. The dissent cited Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), for the proposition that at least four justices believe that racial classifications remedy-
ing past discriminatory effect must be subject to the intermediate rather than strict standard
of review. R.M.G, 454 A.2d at 800. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517-19
(1980) (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, J.J., concurring).
The court advanced the reasoning to hold the adoption statute as a benign use of racial
classification. First, this particular use of the race factor does not presume that one race is
inferior to another, nor does it place the court's rationale behind bigotry or separation. Sec-
ond, although the race factor was not remedial in intent, seeking to improve the position of a
particular racial group, it did protect the best interests of the child.
Chief Judge Newman distinguished the instant case from the majority's use of Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. i (1967). Where the Loving court recognized that the sole purpose and
function of Virginia's antimiscegenation statute was to separate the races, the dissent main-
tained that the District of Columbia adoption statute did indeed have a compelling state
interest: protection of the child's interest. Thus the "benign," rather than "invidious," status
of the racial classification justified intermediate scrutiny. R.M.G, 454 A.2d at 801.
Under the intermediate scrutiny approach, to justify an allegedly benign racial classifica-
tion an "important and articulated purpose" must be shown to justify its use. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J.). It must be an objective that serves an important governmental
purpose to which the prescribed use of race is substantially related. In addition, the purpose
must not stigmatize any group by reflecting a presumption that one race is inferior to an-
other or by putting the weight of government behind racial hatred and separation. Id at
357-58 (Brennan, J.).
74. R.M.G, 454 A.2d at 801. See, e.g., In re Grifliths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). For
the importance of the racial factor, see supra note 68.
75. R.M G., 454 A.2d at 804. According to the dissent, the majority's sole use of famil-
ial attitudes and concurrent environment may result in two paradoxical results. First, if the
1034 [Vol. 32:1022
Constitutional Law
dissent agreed with the majority's conclusion that "the court cannot prop-
erly weigh [the race factor], either automatically or presumptively." It
may only do so if the majority intended that the courts must not be preju-
dicial.76 If, however, the statement was intended to imply that the court
cannot weigh evidence that intraracial, more than interracial, adoption
may further a child's best interest, then the dissent could not agree."
In view of the sociological evidence that documented unique concerns
with interracial adoptions,78 the dissent concluded that a "preference" for
intraracial adoption may be entirely permissible.79 Indeed, the dissent en-
visioned a further potentially paradoxical outcome. An exclusion of the
dissent's intraracial "preference" may introduce a bias against the adop-
tion of a black child by a black family.8" Eliminating a legitimate consid-
eration, the dissent concluded, is just as prejudicial as introducing an
illegitimate one.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's review procedure of dis-
cretionary trial court rulings. In Johnson v. United States," the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals drew a basic distinction between the ordinary
degree of explanation required of a trial court and that expected of admin-
istrative agencies.82 Although the majority cited Johnson for the conten-
tion that a court's consideration of review must be presumed to be limited
only to the words contained in its order, the dissent disagreed, claiming
Johnson never precluded record review to "flesh out" a court's reason-
court need only address attitudes about race, without specific reference to the party's race in
relation to the child, then strict scrutiny would be unnecessary. Second, an overly narrow
view of the race factor would require attention to race's effect upon identity even where the
parents' and the child's race are identical. Id at 804. If attitudes and the extra-familial
environment were to dominate, the dissent maintained, racial factors could not be over-
looked in any adoption. Id
76. Id at 805. In accepting this interpetation, the dissent indicated: "If such language
simply means that the court is not to rule out interracial adoption, inject a personal disap-
proval of interracial adoption, or give racial differences an undue weight as compared with
other factors, it is unobjectionable." Id
77. 1d.
78. See supra note 70.
79. The dissent analogized a preference for intraracial adoption to a preference for a
two parent family or for parents with adequate financial resources. 454 A.2d at 805.
80. Id.
81. 398 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1979).
82. Under D.C. CODE ANN. § 17-305 (1981 & Supp. 1983), agency review requires a
rather detailed statement of findings and analysis. This more detailed analysis exists be-
cause agencies develop specialized expertise in narrow policy areas and the records kept are
highly technical in nature and require detailed explanation. See Washington Pub. Interest
Org. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 393 A.2d 71 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Potomac Elec.
Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 444 U.S. 926 (1979). In contrast, trial courts need not
make such lengthy expositions. See Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365.
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ing.83 The dissent found no authority substantiating the majority's ruling
that the Constitution forbids courts from looking at the trial record to un-
derstand a lower court's reasoning.84
Finally, the dissent challenged the majority decision to reverse. While
the majority conceded that the trial court applied the first prong, 85 the dis-
sent contended that the trial court analysis considered the third prong.86
Left with the second prong, that compares the effect of race on identity in
each family, the dissent concluded that the lower court also satisfied this
prong by inference. 7
In re R.M.G.andEM. supports the commonly held notion that racial
factors may constitutionally be considered by the District of Columbia and
the states in allowing or forbidding interracial adoption petitions. This
case extends this principle, however, by establishing in more precise terms
the degree to which courts may consider the race factor. By establishing
the three-step process, the majority constructs a test that furthers the pre-
cise tailoring of race to the individual so as to comply with constitutional
parameters.
The In re R. M.G. test may have a broad effect upon future court deci-
sions evaluating an interracial adoption's impact upon the family and
child. Because the three prongs provide a "checklist" of criteria a court
must consider, decisions may become more thorough and predictable.
Moreover, the detail resulting from the test's application may ensure deci-
sions tailored more closely to the individual child's best interests. The test
provide a constitutionally sound basis from which courts may consider
race in adoption proceedings.
Although many problems develop in raising children in an interracial
83. R.M.G, 454 A.2d at 807.
84. 1d. at 807-08. The dissent claimed the cases cited in the majority opinion, Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) and Compos, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La.
1972), stood for the tenet that a party seeking to uphold the constitutionality of state action
must demonstrate, during subsequent judicial review, that the action met the appropriate
level of scrutiny. R.MG., 454 A.2d at 808.
85. This prong evaluates how race might affect the child's identity development. Id. at
791-92.
86. This prong evaluates the significance of the families' race when viewed with all
other relevant adoption factors. The dissent noted the trial court's conclusion that the race
factor favored the grandparents while all other factors stood equal-thus meeting the third
prong. Id.
87. Contending that the entire adoption process balances competing petitions in light of
how the families' identity will be affected by race, the dissent deemed the second prong so
fundamental that it was unnecessary for the court to expressly discuss it. The dissent did
find, however, an "explicit statement ... supplied by the court" allegedly evaluating this
prong. Id at 809.
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environment, critical problems also prevail in fragmenting a psychological
parent relationship."8 The majority tempers this constitutional and practi-
cal disadvantage by striking a middle ground whereby race continues to be
relevant but not presumptive or decisive. If the very goal of the adoption
procedures hinges upon decisions in the child's best interests, the options
must be considered in light of the individual's unique needs. The In re
R.M.G. and EM.G. decision attempts to do just that.
D. Michael Reilly
88. In Lucas v. Kreischer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the observations
of Judge Hoffman: "in a multiracial society such as ours, racial prejudice and tension are
inevitable. If. . . children are raised in a happy and stable home, they will be able to cope
with prejudice and hopefully learn that people are unique individuals who should be judged
as such." 450 Pa. 352, 356, 299 A.2d 243, 246 (1973).
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